Job: Applying the Lessons of Recent Conflicts to Current Issues in Defense Policy''. It was the premise of my article that a careful look at significant U.S. military operations over about the past twenty years—roughly the period of time that I have served in Congress—can help shape answers to a surprisingly large number of contemporary issues in defense policy.

LESSONS LEARNED

My research revealed at least twelve military operations during my tenure in Congress, ranging from the small-scale 1985 interception of an aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers to the Persian Gulf War in 1991. We discovered that there were lessons learned in each of these military operations. I won't go into all of these lessons or all of these military operations, but let me summarize just a few of them:

In Lebanon, 1982–1984, we learned that we need force protection measures wherever we deploy our forces.

In Grenada, 1983, we discovered shortcomings in the ability of our forces to plan and execute joint operations.

Panama, 1989–1990, taught us that night operations could be conducted successfully and that stealth technology could work in an operational setting.

The Persian Gulf War, 1990–1991, showed that tactical, operational and strategic thought, derived from the study of yesteryear's conflicts, pays off on the battlefield. It also demonstrated the devastating efficacy of high technology munitions like smart bombs, the success of stealth technology, the importance of establishing air supremacy, and the advantages of disabling the enemy's infrastructure and command, control, and communications ability. The war also made clear that the threat of the use of chemical and biological weapons is real.

It is also interesting to note how General Schwartzkopf used the lessons of history in at least three instances in his successful Desert Storm campaign: First, the thorough 40-day air campaign which preceded the ground war recalls the failure to conduct adequate bombardment at the island of Tarawa in November of 1943. The price paid for that failure at Tarawa was heavy Marine Corps casualties. In the Gulf War, the ability of Iraqi forces to offer opposition to our forces was severely reduced. Second, consider the successful feint carried out by the 1st Cavalry Division prior to the actual start of the ground war. This recalls Montgomery's strategy in 1942 at the Battle of the Marinth Line in North Africa against the German Afrika Corps. This action was a prelude to the decisive battle at El Alamein. Third, by utilizing a leftward flanking movement when he launched the ground war, General Schwartzkopf was taking a page from the book of Robert E. Lee and Stonewall Jackson at the Battle of Chancellorsville. As you will recall, Jackson's forces conducted a brilliant flanking maneuver and completely surprised Union forces under General Joseph Hooker, in the May 1863 battle.

Somalia, 1992–1993, taught us that we should strive to avoid mission creep, and that requests from on-scene commanders for additional equipment, personnel, or other resources must be given appropriate attention by the national command authority.

In summary, my research revealed that even apparently limited military operations have required a very broad range of well-trained and well-equipped forces. We don't have the luxury of picking and choosing what missions to prepare for. And all of this is expensive—we cannot expect to have global reach, or to be engaged in Europe, Asia, and other places around the world, on the cheap. We learned that while we still have much to work on—making the Army more deployable for one thing, how to move from peacekeeping by military forces to nation-building by largely civilian institutions for another—we have actually done a lot right. The U.S. military has shown the ability to absorb the lessons of each new operation. Improvements have been made in command arrangements, in operational planning, in tactics and doctrine, in training, and in key technologies. Precision strike capabilities have matured. Congress, yes Congress, has sometimes helped. Congress's establishment of an independent Special Operations Command in 1987 has been vindicated by the continued critical importance of special operations forces in a host of military actions since then, and by the marvelous performance of those forces when called upon. Congressional passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 clearly helped to clarify and strengthen command arrangements.

KOREA, 1950

What caused me to think back on a now two-year-old article was the information that a group of Korean War Veterans would be in the audience today. No veterans from any war suffered more from the failure to heed the lessons of history than the veterans of the Korean War. Let me quote a passage from a book by former journalist Robert Donovan which describes the experience of elements of the 24th, Division upon their arrival in Korea in July, 1950:

''Out-gunned, lacking in heavy antitank weapons, unfamiliar with the terrain, ill prepared for combat after the soft life of occupation duty in Japan, the 24th Division soldiers were disorganized and confused, hampered by early-morning fog, exhausted by midday heat, and frustrated by faulty communications. Mis-directed mortar fire from one unit caused injuries and death in another. Chronically, supplies of ammunition ran low. Men were ambushed or were completely cut off in strange villages and never seen again. Mortars and machine guns were abandoned in the bedlam of battle . . .''

This was the experience of Task Force Smith and the other units which were among the first to deploy to Korea. Historians can argue over why we were so unprepared for conflict in Korea. Perhaps it was overconfidence after our great victory in World War II. Perhaps it was the tendency of the U.S. to ''bring the boys home'' immediately after a war—a tendency then-Major George C. Marshall noted in a 1923 speech—which led to cuts in the military that were too deep in a still-dangerous world.

Whatever the reason for our unpreparedness, there can be no disagreement on this: No group of Americans ever fought more bravely than those we called upon to serve in the Korean War. In the past decade, a lot of people have stepped forward to take credit for winning the Cold War. Let me tell who should get the credit. It is these Korean War veterans who are with us today. Their courage, their sacrifices, drew a line in sand against Communist expansion. There would be other battles—in Vietnam and in other places around the globe. But in Korea, a country most Americans had never heard of before 1950, the message was sent. America would fight to preserve freedom. We owe you a debt of gratitude we can never repay. Indeed, the whole world owes you a debt of gratitude. It is not enough, but I just want to say, ''Thank you.''

THE BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE

Recently, I visited TRADOC headquarters at Ft. Monroe, and received an excellent briefing from General John Abrams and his staff, especially Colonel Maxie MacFarland, on the ''Battlefield of the Future''. Allow me to summarize that briefing from my perspective—a country lawyer who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, and who is an avid student of military history:

It should be obvious that we are not the only military that has learned lessons from these U.S. military operations which I discussed earlier, and from others around the world, such as Chechnya. The U.S. military is the most studied military in the world. All major U.S. field manuals and joint doctrinal publications are freely available on the internet, and indeed, U.S. military internet sites are frequently accessed by foreign organizations. Foreign military students from 125 countries around the world attend U.S. military education institutions, such as this one, or specialized U.S. military schools under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. Our openness and reliance on information systems means that our adversaries in the future will have a greater depth of knowledge about the capabilities and operational designs of U.S. military forces.

We have advantages now in air, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other technology, and we will likely continue to have these advantages in the future. Our potential adversaries know we have these advantages and they will seek to offset them in some of the following ways:

They will seek to fight during periods of reduced visibility, in complex terrain, and in urban environments where they can gain sanctuary.

They may use terrorist organizations to take the fight to the U.S. homeland, and they could possibly use weapons of mass destruction, or attacks on infrastructure and information systems.

They will attempt to confuse U.S. forces so that the size, location, disposition, and intention of their forces will be impossible to discern. They will try to make U.S. forces vulnerable to unconventional actions and organizations.

To offset the U.S. technological overmatch, they will use selective or niche technology, perhaps even commercially-obtained technology, to degrade U.S. capabilities. As an example, during the first Chechen War, the Chechens bought commercial scanners and radios, and used them to intercept Russian communications.

They will endeavor to exploit the perception that the American will is vulnerable to the psychological shock of unexpected and unexplained losses. Their goal will be a battlefield which contains greater psychological and emotional impacts.

In this environment, U.S. forces may no longer be able to count on low casualties, a secure homeland, precision attacks, and a relatively short duration conflict. Conflict may occur in regions where the enemy has a greater knowledge and understanding of the physical environment, and has forces which know how to take advantage of it. They will seek to avoid environments where U.S. abilities are dominant. They will have more situational awareness than possible for U.S. forces.

My briefers at TRADOC referred to this kind of conflict as ''asymmetric warfare''. And as I listened to the briefing, I thought back on my military history and I realized the truth of the old cliche that there is ''nothing new under the sun.'' Asymmetric warfare is not something new. In fact, it has been a part of American military history. Let me give you a couple of examples:

The first is from that series of conflicts that we collectively refer to as the Indian Wars, and it has a direct relation to the place we are standing right now. On July 18, 1763, during Pontiac's War, Colonel Henry